Clinton finally sited along with Bush for intelligence failors leading to Sep 11th

Just for you Clinton lovers,

Taken from:Washington Post, March 24, 2004.

9/11 Panel Critical Of Clinton, Bush

Officials From Both Administrations Defend Response to Al Qaeda Threat

By Dan Eggen and John Mintz, Washington Post Staff Writers

The commission investigating the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks issued a stinging condemnation yesterday of the U.S. government's failed hunt for Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda terrorist network, finding that both the Clinton and Bush administrations focused too heavily on diplomacy that did not work and were reluctant to consider aggressive military action.

The criticism prompted spirited defenses from top Clinton and Bush officials, who testified in a day-long public hearing that the government proceeded as aggressively as possible given what was known about the threat from al Qaeda.

Several of the witnesses, including Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, also suggested that there was little public or congressional appetite for military action against Afghanistan, which harbored al Qaeda, until after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and that even removing bin Laden may not have prevented the hijackings.

"This administration came in fully recognizing the threat presented to the United States and its interests and allies around the world by terrorism," Powell said. "We went to work on it immediately. The president made it clear it was a high priority."

But the new reports by the commission's investigative staff portray the Bush administration as giving terrorism scant attention during its first eight months, noting that officials did not draw up concrete plans to confront al Qaeda and its Afghan protectors until just days before the Sept. 11 attacks.

The reports suggest that many of the Clinton administration's policies also were ineffectual, revealing significant new details about as many as four missed opportunities to kill or capture bin Laden in 1998 and 1999.

The reports also appear to confirm some of the key criticisms made by Richard A. Clarke, the former counterterrorism coordinator for Clinton and Bush, in a book released Monday that has revived the bitter debate over the government's war on terror. Clarke set off a political firestorm with allegations that the current administration neglected the al Qaeda threat in part because senior officials were obsessed with attacking Iraq, and accused both administrations of failing to act aggressively enough. He is scheduled to testify before the commission today, along with CIA Director George J. Tenet, Clinton national security adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger and Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage.

Addressing what more could have been done, Madeleine K. Albright, Clinton's secretary of state, said: "I can say with confidence that President Clinton and his team did everything we could, everything that we could think of, based on the knowledge we had, to protect our people and disrupt and defeat al Qaeda. We certainly recognized the threat posed by the terrorist groups."

The panel, formally known as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, is a 10-member bipartisan commission established by Congress to examine the missteps leading up to the attacks. Unlike previous efforts, including a joint inquiry by the House and Senate intelligence committees, the commission is conducting a wide-ranging probe that reviews foreign policy, aviation, border control and other issues. It is scheduled to issue a report this summer.

The panel has engaged in repeated battles with the Bush administration over access to documents and witnesses, and several commissioners repeated their request yesterday that national security adviser Condoleezza Rice be permitted to testify. Rice, citing the opinion of White House lawyers, has declined to appear, but has submitted to private interviews with the commission. The current and former presidents and vice presidents also are scheduled to be interviewed privately.

The panel's staff issued reports earlier this year showing that the government fumbled repeated opportunities to stop many of the hijackers from entering the country. Among the new findings disclosed yesterday:

*The Clinton administration had as many as four chances to kill or capture bin Laden between December 1998 and July 1999, but all the operations were scuttled because of uncertain intelligence and fears that civilians or dignitaries might be killed. In one example, in May 1999, sources provided detailed reports about bin Laden's whereabouts in the Kandahar area over a period of five nights, but strikes were not ordered because the military was concerned about the accuracy of the reports and the risk of collateral damage, investigators found.

"Having a chance to get [bin Laden] three times in 36 hours and foregoing the chance each time has made me a bit angry," a CIA unit chief wrote to a colleague, adding that Tenet "finds himself alone at the table, with the other princip[als] basically saying 'we'll go along with your decision Mr. Director,' and implicitly saying that the Agency will hang alone if the attack doesn't get [bin Laden]."

*Rumsfeld told the commission in earlier interviews that he "did not recall any particular counterterrorism issue that engaged his attention before 9/11," other than the debate over preparing armed drones to target bin Laden.

*A month after the Clinton administration launched missile strikes on al Qaeda targets in retaliation for the 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa, counterterrorism officials within the Pentagon prepared a paper proposing "a more aggressive counterterrorism posture" to "take up the gauntlet that international terrorists have thrown at our feet." The authors also warned that in case of more "horrific attacks . . . we will have no choice nor, unfortunately, will we have a plan."

The eight-point proposal went nowhere, in part because senior officials thought the plan was too aggressive, investigators found.

*In the spring of 1998, the Saudi government broke up a plot organized by bin Laden to launch attacks on U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia using portable missiles. Scores were arrested, but the Saudis did not publicize the case at the time, the commission report said.

*U.S. officials learned that Hamid Gul, the former head of Pakistani intelligence, had assured Taliban leaders in July 1999 that he would provide three or four hours of warning before any U.S. missile launch as he had the "last time" -- an apparent reference to the failed 1998 missile strike.

Testifying yesterday were Albright, Powell, Rumsfeld and Clinton defense secretary William S. Cohen. The pairs of representatives agreed with one another on many broad issues, including the difficulties of targeting bin Laden and his allies before Sept. 11, 2001, and the perceived lack of political support for military action during those years. Some commissioners, particularly former senator Bob Kerrey (D-Neb.), argued that both administrations could have rallied support for military operations just as they did in Kosovo and Iraq, respectively.

The officials from both administrations also struck a similar theme on the question of preventing the terror strikes, arguing that it is unclear how effective aggressive action might have been, given the extent of the plot and the determination of the participants. Powell noted that al Qaeda and its allies have continued launching attacks even after the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan in late 2001.

"Anything we might have done against al Qaeda in this period or against Osama bin Laden may or may not have had any influence on these people who were already in this country," Powell said.

Albright said that "things looked very different before 9/11. We were mostly accused of overreacting, not underreacting."

But each side disparaged the other on several occasions. Albright, for example, bemoaned many of the policy changes pursued by Bush and his aides after they took office, while Rumsfeld said the new president was determined not to repeat the Clinton administration's tactic of "bouncing the rubble" by sending cruise missiles at al Qaeda sites of little strategic value.

Rumsfeld and Powell defended the administration's pace in adopting new strategies to battle al Qaeda and persuade the Taliban to give up bin Laden. Final plans for both were completed the week before the terrorist attacks.

Cohen and Albright similarly defended Clinton's actions against al Qaeda. Cohen said that missile strikes against bin Laden were called off in each instance because of CIA doubts about the accuracy of the intelligence involved.

In his testimony, Powell confirmed one claim by Clarke that Paul D. Wolfowitz, the deputy defense secretary who strongly supported U.S. military action against Iraq, suggested an attack on the government of Saddam Hussein during a meeting at Camp David just four days after the 2001 attacks. President Bush "said first things first," Powell said. "He decided on Afghanistan." Wolfowitz, who appeared alongside Rumsfeld later, did not directly address the issue.

Research editor Margot Williams contributed to this report.

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